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Abstract 
The main purpose of this article is to focus on the issue of protecting information privacy through the newly 
developed cloud computing technology.  This article will first introduce the characteristics of cloud computing 
technology.  Then the impact of the technology will be discussed through disparity of legal protection of information 
privacy within Internet among different jurisdictions.  The personal observation and a would-be solution will be made 
at the end of this article for a future possible adjustment of legal infrastructure for the protection of information 
privacy within cyberspace. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.  
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1. Introduction 
The technology of cloud computing is based on the concept that all the data processing or control will 
not happen in the end user.  This technology is not brand new, but its new application actually arouses a 
lot of deep concerns that will have profound meaning to our legal infrastructure.  The main purpose of this 
article is to focus on the issue of protecting information privacy through a newly developed cloud 
computing technology.  This article introduces the characteristics of newly developed cloud computing 
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technology first, and then indicates the reasons for emphasizing the issue of information privacy related to 
any new application of cloud computing technology.  The impact of such technology will be discussed 
through disparity of legal protection of information privacy within Internet among different jurisdictions.  
Especially, how the newly passed legislation-Personal Information Protection Act in Taiwan would 
interact with the cloud computing technology and the idea of “accountability” might be the best solution 
under the circumstances will also be discussed in this article as an example.  The personal observation and 
would-be solution will be made at the end of this article for a future possible adjustment of legal 
infrastructure of protection of information privacy within cyberspace. 
2. Infrastructure of Cloud Computing Technology and its Security 
This section examines the technology of cloud computing and its characteristics of security and 
privacy. 
2.1. Introduction of cloud computing 
As information and communications technology advances, computing is considered as the 5th most 
important utility besides water, electricity, gas, and telephony [1].  The success of Internet has led the 
computing ability shift from a person’s desktop computer to service providers’ computers over the 
Internet.  The service of cloud computing is a trend to deliver, on demand, IT (Information Technology) 
resources on a pay per use basis.  As defined in Buyya et al. [1], “A Cloud is a type of parallel and 
distributed system consisting of a collection of inter-connected and virtualized computers that are 
dynamically provisioned and presented as one or more unified computing resource(s) based on service-
level agreements established through negotiation between the service provider and consumers.”  The user 
data and software reside on the Internet, possibly in datacenters and clusters located in different countries, 
which reduces the role of personal computer to a “dumb terminal” to access cloud via Internet.  
Computing resources are owned and managed by a cloud service provider (CSP).  Using virtualization 
techniques, these virtualized resources, such as hardware, platforms, or services, are dynamically 
allocated to scale on demand according to customers’ needs.  If a CSP fails to offer the demand, the CSP 
may outsource to other CSPs. 
The working definition of the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [2] defined 
four deployment models of cloud computing - private cloud, community cloud, public cloud, and hybrid 
cloud.  Private cloud is meant solely for an organization, while public cloud is for general public.  
Community cloud is for specific community composed of several organizations with shared concerns.  
Hybrid cloud is a composition of clouds.  Both private and community clouds are managed by the 
organization(s) or a third party and may exist on or off premise; public cloud is managed and owned by 
CSP.  There are other different classifications; for example, Ruiter and Warnier [3] classify clouds into 
public clouds, private external clouds, private internal clouds and hybrid clouds.  In a public cloud, the 
cloud is physically located outside the premises of the organization and the same hardware may host 
several clouds.  In private external clouds, the hardware hosts only one specific customer.  This creates 
better security.  In private internal clouds, the infrastructure is managed and owned within the 
organization.  This reduces the security exposure problem of public clouds.  Hybrid clouds are a 
combination of internal and external providers. 
NIST also describes cloud computing using three service models - Software as a Service (SaaS), 
Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) [2].  SaaS provides software 
applications to users.  PaaS provides users with development platforms to develop and execute software.  
IaaS provides computing, storage, or networking infrastructure. 
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A comprehensive taxonomy for describing cloud computing architecture is shown in Rimal et al. [4].  
The taxonomy is used to survey several existing cloud computing services by comparing features like 
computing architecture, virtualization management, service, load balancing, fault tolerance, 
interoperability, storage, security, and programming framework. 
The cloud computing has several important benefits.  The most appealing one for customers is cost 
saving.  Computing service consumers pay service providers when they access services.  They do not 
need to make a large upfront capital investment in purchasing computers with enough processing power 
and storage capacity to satisfy the peak demand, thus lowering the barrier to entry for new business.  The 
administration and maintenance costs are also reduced, for example, users will no longer need to worry 
about the problems of hard drive crashing, backups, or upgrading.  Since the computing and storage 
facilities are in the cloud, users can use simpler devices, like less powerful computers, cell phones, or 
PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants), to access the cloud, and they can access from anywhere in the world 
where they can connect to the Internet, which provides mobility and convenience.  
Cloud computing service providers are relieved of the piracy problem of unauthorized copying, which 
has plagued the software developers for years.  Since the computation occurs on providers’ servers, it will 
be extremely difficult for copying or reverse engineering.  The intellectual property protection is thus 
easier.  Besides, cloud computing service providers can be always sure that their customers are using the 
most up-to-date version of their software.  Finally, they can use sophisticated data mining algorithms 
based on customers’ data and serve carefully targeted advertising to customers. 
2.2. Security and privacy 
The advantages of cloud computing can become disadvantages.  Although the cloud providers can 
afford and might implement better security mechanism into their systems than the common end-users, 
like hiring security experts and installing anti-virus software, the facts of remote access, virtualization, 
platform sharing, border crossing, lack of data control, and massive use of third party services and 
infrastructures all make security and privacy a major worry. A complete list of risks can be found in 
Catteddu and Hogben [5], where the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) has 
identified 35 risks of using cloud computing. 
Firstly, clouds are on Internet; therefore, all the security problems related to Internet, including frauds 
and attacks by hackers, may happen. Actually the problems become more significant because cloud 
services make heavy use of Internet.  Secondly, sensitive data, like medical records, are no longer 
protected by physical quarantine.  Ristenpart et al. [6] argue that fundamental risks arise from sharing 
physical infrastructure between users, even when their actions are isolated through machine virtualization 
as within a third-party cloud compute service.  Thirdly, data may be stored and processed in different 
geographical locations with different regulations.  Users may lack awareness regarding the location, 
which will cause serious jurisdiction and legal compliance troubles.  Fourthly, trust becomes a big issue.  
CSPs have full access to the data stored on their clouds.  Besides, CSPs may hesitate to provide a safer 
mechanism because of business considerations.  For example, Soghoian [7] believes that the likely reason 
Google took several years to offer HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure), an industry standard 
encryption protocol, by default is the issue of cost because encryption takes processing power and 
memory.  According to Kant et al. [8], the computational cost of the transactions using SSL (Secure 
Socket Layer) will increase by a factor of 5-7.  In addition, for those companies with business models 
getting profit from data mining and then serving advertising, they definitely won’t be happy to see their 
customers upload encrypted data, which obstruct the data mining job.  Fifthly, some people are worried 
because it will be easier for government snooping [7, 9].  Government may force CSPs to place a back 
door.  Soghoian [7] mentioned that some key features, like identifiable customers, automatic, silent 
updates, and the complete absence of visible product releases, make it far easier for the government to 
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effectively force the deployment of covert back doors on clouds than traditional software products.   
Several solutions have been proposed for the security and privacy problem.  The most obvious way 
out for users is to encrypt whatever data they are going to put in the cloud.  But it will increase the cost of 
computation and it is technically cumbersome to process the data in an encrypted form.  For example, 
searching and indexing the data become a challenging job.  Plainly download all the encrypted data, 
decrypt and search on local computers is not practical.  Thus, a fully homomorphic cryptosystem, a 
system which can perform calculations, basically addition and multiplication, on encrypted data without 
decrypting and still keep them secure has long been a desire.  Recently, an amazing work of fully 
homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices [10] has been announced by IBM.  Unfortunately, it still 
takes time to become practical.  As Gentry, the author of fully homomorphic encryption using ideal 
lattices, estimates, in the case of performing a Google search with encrypted keywords, for instance, it 
would multiply the necessary computing time by around 1 trillion [11].  It probably takes 40 years to be 
as efficient as a search today according to Moore’s law estimated by Schneier [12].  Therefore, a practical 
fully homomorphic cryptosystem is still an open issue. 
Several other approaches also have been presented.  Chow et al. [13] propose to extend control 
measures from the enterprise into the cloud through the use of Trusted Computing and applied 
cryptographic techniques.  A privacy manager is suggested by Pearson and Shen [14].  And PasS (Privacy 
as a Service), a set of security protocols for ensuring the privacy and legal compliance, is used to 
maximize users’ control in Itani et al. [15]. 
Besides, some studies focus on auditing or assessment.  For example, to check the integrity of data on 
clouds, it is necessary to introduce a third party auditor.  Wang et al. [16] present a privacy-preserving 
public auditing system for cloud data storage security by utilizing a public key-based homomorphic 
authenticator and integrating it with random mask technique while keeping the requirements of auditing 
the cloud data storage without demanding the local copy of data, introducing no additional on-line burden 
to the cloud user, and bringing in no new vulnerabilities toward user data privacy.  Some [17, 18] try to 
consider cloud maturity from an enterprise level perspective by introducing capability maturity model 
(CMM), which is a model to understand how mature an organization is to produce required outcomes 
through a set of structured levels with various characteristics.  Moreover, Pearson [19] advocates the use 
of Privacy Impact Assessments [20], a process to help organizations assess the impact of their operations 
on personal privacy launched by the UK (United Kingdom) Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO).  
ICO, as cited in the website, is the UK’s independent authority set up to uphold information rights in the 
public interest, promoting openness by public bodies and data privacy for individuals.  Pearson [19] also 
shows how differing privacy requirements apply at different phases of design, and also suggests six top 
tips for software engineers with specific technology to be used. 
2.3. Accountability 
The concept of accountability [21], which is first established by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”), provides an improved solution to transborder data protection.  
Five essential elements of accountability, according to [21], include  
(1) Organisation commitment to accountability and adoption of internal policies consistent with 
external criteria; 
(2) Mechanisms to put privacy policies into effect, including tools, training and education; 
(3) Systems for internal, ongoing oversight and assurance reviews and external verification; 
(4) Transparency and mechanisms for individual participation; and 
(5) Means for remediation and external enforcement. 
The real-world implementation questions are also addressed in [22], such as the following 
fundamentals the organizations will need to demonstrate and regulators will measure. 
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(1) Policies 
(2) Executive oversight 
(3) Staffing and delegation 
(4) Education and awareness 
(5) Ongoing risk assessment and mitigation 
(6) Program risk assessment oversight and validation 
(7) Event management and complaint handling 
(8) Internal enforcement 
(9) Redress 
There are some successful implementations of accountability.  Yao et al. [23] propose a novel design 
to enforce strong accountability in the Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) deployed in the Cloud. 
Therefore, the Accountability Service introduced can enforce compliance on the service providers, who 
participates in business collaborations in the Cloud and faults can always be bound to their causers.  
Pearson also proposes an approach in which procedural and technical solutions are co-designed to 
demonstrate accountability as a path forward to resolving jurisdictional privacy and security risks within 
the cloud [24]. 
3. The Importance of Impact to Legal Infrastructure for the Information Privacy Protection within 
Internet through Cloud Computing Technology 
Although the newly developed cloud computing technology may have influenced the rights of both 
business entities and individuals, it is not the authors’ intent to discuss the protection of legal rights 
pertained to business entities, such as the issue of unfair competition, the protection of trade secrets etc.  
The thinking behind this differential treatment to the legal issues with regard to such cloud computing 
technology is based upon not only those business entities that have the predominate financial power to 
stand for their own rights but also, in unfair competition litigation between business entities, the rule of 
reason [25] moves the judgment for unfair competition toward case-by-case decision-making process and 
it is still unclear what the balancing result for such cloud computing would be until the real case comes 
out [26].  The above-mentioned situations for business entities actually elicit the idea that individuals are 
in a disadvantageous position and need clear legislation for the protection of information privacy while 
facing the new development of cloud computing technology.  With such understanding in mind, this 
article aims at tackling the important issue of regulating information privacy protection within Internet 
while facing the newly developed cloud computing technology.  In the following discussion, focusing on 
the protection of information privacy within cyberspace, this paper will first introduce the current status 
of information privacy protection in the United States and European Community within cyberspace, and 
then discuss the potential problems for these two different legal approaches when trying to regulate 
activities based upon the newly developed cloud computing technology.  The experience of Taiwan while 
facing the revision of Personal Information Protection Act will lead to the discussion of the future 
prospective and best solution for the impact of such technology on legal protection in individual 
information privacy at the end of this article. 
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4. Different Legal Approaches for the Protection of Information Privacy within Cyberspace, their 
Potential Problems and Future Prospective with Best Solution in Dealing with the New 
Development in Cloud Computing Technology from Taiwan’s Experience 
4.1. The current protection for information privacy in the United States and European Community within 
cyberspace and the potential problems 
In the United States, it could be fairly said there are different laws that can be used in protecting 
information privacy within cyberspace.  It is not the intention of this paper to discuss individual 
legislations in detail.  This legislative phenomenon indicates that information privacy is treated differently 
according to different kinds of information or entities.  It also shows that one kind of information privacy 
may have different laws regulated at the same time.  For example, the Privacy Act of 1974 regulates the 
government’s use of personal information.  It applies to all agencies working with personal information 
contained in a system of records [27].  Another E-Government Act also requires the government agent to 
conduct Privacy Impact Assessments in order to evaluate the impact of information technology to 
information privacy [27].  The government agencies are regulated not only by these two federal 
legislations because they are federal agencies but may also by Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) [28] and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
because the government entity is the health insurance company, health-care clearinghouse, and 
prescription Drug Card Sponsor.  HIPAA is setting the floor for protecting the individual medical 
information privacy with a lot of exceptions which are basically regulated between 45 C.F.R § 164.506-
514, for example consent, business agreement between entities and their agents, public policy etc.  And 
with Obama administration coming into power and Congress passing the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, the protection of information privacy in HIPAA has not only been broadened 
by the scope of regulated subjects (including entities’ agents), but more importantly been added by two 
mechanisms to the protection of information privacy: government committee for developing the security 
standard technology and notification of information security breach.  As a matter of fact, a lot of states in 
the United States have enacted the law for notification of security breach for computerized personal 
information [28]. 
Even though the United States is trying to enforce the protection of information privacy, especially 
within cyberspace, there is one commonly criticized problem hidden in “The Stored Communications 
Act”, which is codified in chapter 121 from section 2701 to 2712 in U.S. Code.  According to such 
legislation, no matter whether it is an electronic communication service provider or a remote computing 
service provider, these service providers may voluntarily disclose customers’ information content under 
certain circumstances, for example authorization by law, lawful consent etc., and the cloud computing 
service provider may be qualified either as an electronic communication service provider or a remote 
computing service provider depending on whether the service content can fit in by definition [29].  Under 
the coverage of “The Stored Communications Act”, “as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the 
service” is one exception to the duty of protecting information privacy.  Although there are also 
exceptions in HIPAA, the purpose of these regulations is for public or private health and seems gaining 
more justification other than the exception - “incident to the rendition of the service”- in “The Stored 
Communications Act” for the electronic communication service provider or remote computing service 
provider.  Furthermore, in law enforcement practice, the government needs only subpoena or court order 
to get the stored communication or even the transactional data instead of the search warrant [30]. 
It is still not very clear whether the model of protection of information privacy within cyberspace in 
the United States represents the position of information privacy in constitutional hierarchy; at least, the 
Supreme Court never admits the information privacy as the fundamental right.  Even information privacy 
is treated differently in cyberspace according to different kinds of information or entities as mentioned 
before; the general tendency is the preventive measurements (standard of information security and 
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notification of such security breach) will be imputed on such protection of information privacy in 
cyberspace.  And it is also worth noticing that there has been some insufficiency apparently in the 
protection of information privacy within cyberspace in the United States. 
In the European Community, the most important Directive for the protection of individual information 
privacy is 95/46/EC [31].  In Directive 95/46/EC, there are several aspects in the issue of protecting 
individual information privacy which need attention.  First of all, Article 8 of Directive 95/46/EC 
manifests that personal data that reveal racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership and data concerning health or sex must be protected with 
certain exceptions.  And also in Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications, the 
notification of information security breach is also required for providers of public electronic 
communications networks and services including telecom operators, mobile phone communication 
service providers, internet access providers, providers of the transmission of digital TV content, and other 
providers of electronic communication services that are offered to the public instead of private electronic 
communications networks and services (closed user groups and corporate networks).  Any breach of 
information security must be reported to the authorities, and if it is likely to adversely affect any 
individual, then notify that individual [32].  Besides the scope of protection of information privacy and 
the notification of information security breach, in Article 10-11 of Directive 95/46/EC, the notification of 
information collection is generally required except for some exceptions, which is different from focusing 
on specific types of information in the United States.  From the above-mentioned statement, it can be 
fairly said the scope of information privacy protected in European Community and the requirement of 
notifying information collection are broader (intensive) than in the United States, and in the European 
Community, the burden of notifying information security breach is imputed on the communication 
service provider rather than the data processing entity.   
One might be arguing that the protection of information privacy in cyberspace in the European 
Community seems stronger than in the United States.  This is reflected both in 95/46/EC and the safe 
harbor agreement between the European Community and the United States.  According to Article 25 of 
95/46/EC, the member states basically can transfer the personal data outside the European Community 
only if such third country has adequate protection of personal information.  To follow the requirements 
contained in the safe harbor agreement is equal to satisfy the meaning of adequate protection of personal 
information.  The transferee must be certified by Federal Trade Commission and register with the 
Department of Commerce by disclosing its privacy policy [3] in order to qualify the transborder 
information requirement in Article 25 of 95/46/EC. 
4.2. The specific legal concerns for the protection of information privacy related to cloud computing 
technology both in the United States and European Community 
Not only the different approaches adopted by the United States and European Community, but also 
the difficulties in applying the regulations to the cloud computing technology in the issue of protection of 
information  privacy within Cyberspace.  The specific difficulties in applying the newly developed cloud 
computing technology to current legislative schemes for the protection of information privacy in 
cyberspace for both the United States and the European Community will be pointed out in this section to 
indicate possible confusions existing in these two jurisdictions. 
In the United States, there are problems in applying the legislations protecting information privacy to 
such newly developed information technology.  For example, in “The Stored Communications Act”, 
except E-mail which may be qualified as the electronic communication service, to be the remote 
computing service, the service must be “solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer 
processing services”.  These definitions may leave multi-functioned cloud computing services outside the 
regulation of “The Stored Communications Act”, although this does not seem to be the intention of 
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legislators who have passed the law [29].  Also in HIPAA or even American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 enforced the protection of on-line medical information privacy, whether the meaning of 
statutory entities or their business associate includes different kinds of cloud computing service providers 
needs to be clarified to make sure such service providers are regulated by these two legislations.  There 
are also problems in deciding whether the cloud computing service providers are the data controllers or 
the data processors where the former is mainly regulated in the European Community, especially if the 
cloud computing service provider may function as both, a data controller and data processor [24].  
4.3. The Personal Information Protection Act in Taiwan and the tentative solution in dealing with the 
challenge to protect information privacy within cloud computing environments 
From the description of legislations and potential problems for both the United States and European 
Community in facing the issue of protection of information privacy within cloud computing environments, 
it can be seen that there are different approaches and also different potential problems in applying the 
legislation for protecting information privacy to the cloud computing technology.  The legislation in 
Taiwan also cannot immune form facing this kind of situation.  The discussion in this section will 
introduce newly passed Personal Information Protection Act and its problems in reality, especially facing 
the cloud computing technology.  And the tentative solution will be brought up especially through the 
discussion of Taiwan’s experience. 
In Taiwan, the legislators passed the revision of Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Law in 
2010 which is entitled “Personal Information Protection Act” [33].  The basic blue print for Personal 
Information Protection Act for protection of personal information is formed on the lines of the counterpart 
protection in European Community with some more protection to the degree.  There are several special 
features in the Personal Information Protection Act as follows: 
1. Expending the scope of protection: Under Article 2 in the Act, any information able to directly and 
indirectly identify the individual will fall under the definition of personal information. 
2. Adding the enhanced protection of sensitive personal information privacy: Under Article 6 in the Act, 
personal information of medical treatment, genetic information, sexual life, health examination and 
criminal record shall not be collected except for several specific situations. 
3. The obligation to notify for gathering personal information: Under Article 8 and 9 in the Act, the 
information collector has the obligation to notify the person whose information has been gathered 
whether the information is collected directly from the person or from the third party. 
4. The obligation to notify the person for the security breach whose personal information has been 
collected: This is regulated in Art 12 in the Act. 
5. The extraterritorial jurisdiction for criminal liability based upon the nationality: This has been regulated 
in Article 43 in the Act.  
The observation of the Personal Information Protection Act in Taiwan to the development of cloud 
computing technology is the Act not only causes the confusion and difficulty with this regard but 
sometimes even makes the operation of cloud computing technology impossible.  First, the major 
confusion will result from the legal hierarchy related to other civil or criminal laws which can also be 
used as the channel to protect the information privacy.  According to the legislative explanation, the 
Personal Information Protection Act shall be subordinate to other civil or criminal laws if they are directly 
conflicting with each other.  As known from the introduction just mentioned before, the Act is more 
stringent in protecting the information privacy, but unfortunately, it is at the bottom of legal hierarchy in 
protecting the information privacy.  There is a highly possibility that the disparity of protection (balance 
of interest) would come out at the same situation just because based on the different legal authorities. 
Secondly, the highly regulated provisions in the Act (for example the notification of acquiring 
information and its retroactive effects) really cause a lot of panic in Taiwan.  That is exactly why the 
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Personal Information Protection Act is still waiting for its effectiveness date even the Act has already 
been passed by the legislation in Taiwan.  How to exactly regulate the personal information pertained in 
the cloud computing technology is still up in the air. 
Finally, some provisions in the Act will actually make the operation of cloud computing technology 
almost impossible.  For example, under the Article 6 of the Act, the sensitive personal information cannot 
be gathered even it is consented by the resource person except for the listed specific purpose.  Under the 
provision, it is highly unlikely to use the cloud computing technology in personnel health information 
gathering.  It is also highly questionable for Taiwan to establish the general public health information 
cloud without the specific purpose for medical treatment, personal hygiene or prevention of crime.   
After explaining the possible difficulties to apply the current legislations to regulate the newly 
developed cloud computing technology, especially based on Taiwan’s experience, to bring the discussion 
up to the next level is to inquire how to overhaul the protective infrastructure for the information privacy 
in order to prepare for the impact caused by such technological phenomenon.  This article will divide the 
protective infrastructure for the information privacy into two parts: the substantive legislation and the 
accountability practice.   
First, to the substantive legislation part, besides clarifying the legal definitions or confusion in the 
legislation among the United States, European Community and Taiwan as mentioned before, one 
important task needs to be tackled is whether these current legislations among these jurisdictions over-
excessively or insufficiently protect the information privacy under the clouding computing technology 
which needed to make the change.  There is no doubt that the development of cloud computing 
technology highly raised the concern about information privacy within cyberspace [34] and the heavy use 
of such service is the reason why the privacy concern becomes so significant [35].  So, at first, it is 
suggested that at least the strength of information privacy protection under this cloud computing 
technology shall not lower than the general protection of information privacy.  As to whether to choose 
the United States approach or European Community approach is the issue that needs to be discussed.  It is 
observed that the fundamental reason for these two kinds of differential treatment is different recognitions 
of information privacy in constitutional hierarchy.  The Supreme Court of the United States still has not 
recognized the information privacy as one of the core fundamental rights, unlike the European 
Community.  It is suggested that the notification of information security breach should be regulated as a 
preventive measurement; not only is it a common trend both in the United States and the European 
Community but also is focused on the third-party unlawful activity without serious issues of balance of 
interests.  With regard to the notification of acquiring information and other possible legal remedies, it is 
better to adopt the United States approach which is more flexible in balancing different interests in the 
protection of information privacy with some modifications to enhance the protection of information 
privacy within cyberspace.  To limit the exceptions of “the Stored Communications Act” to some extent 
and lift the exception of unprotected transactional data are two of the examples.  This article also suggests 
loosening the restrictive regulation for sensitive information in Taiwan for the purpose of national health.  
Last but not least, the jurisdiction issue may also have the significant importance related to the 
enforcement of the protection of information privacy, especially the current protections are somewhat 
different in different jurisdictions, but the final solution is going to count on the possible international 
treaty and it is still up in the air. 
As to the accountability practice part, the idea for this mechanism has been introduced and explained 
early in this article.  Generally speaking, the substance of accountability indicates the merger of 
management, legal compliance and technology as the trinity.  The concept of accountability actually bring 
the adjustment of legislation up to the next level within the broaden meaning of legal infrastructure for the 
protection of personal information privacy through the development of cloud computing technology.  The 
phenomenon of paying attention not only to the substantive legislation but also to the accountability 
practice is really happening in Taiwan.  The Science & Technology Law Institute under the Institute For 
Information Industry in Taiwan is now trying to realize the accountability concept through building up the 
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certificate system in protecting the personal information privacy, especially for the purpose of protection 
within Cyberspace.  Through building up the system to make entity to commitment to legal compliance 
through technology measurement, there are three different organizations with their own function for the 
system operation: the organization to set up the standard which is the Science & Technology Law 
Institute, the organization to certify the fulfillment of the standard and the organization to counsel the 
implement of the system.  Even the newly development in Taiwan is in its beginning stage, the trend of 
emphasizing the accountability practice is worth continuing attention and observation. 
5. Conclusion 
The development of technology often will need to consider the possible impact within the legal 
infrastructure.  Sometimes the possible impact will create a whole new legal issue.  Sometimes it will 
make a preexisting legal issue prominent.  The protection of information privacy under the development 
of cloud computing technology is the latter situation.  This article is trying to discuss the best scenario 
from two parts-the substantive legislation and the accountability practice, where the legal infrastructure 
can respond with such development in the issue of protecting information privacy within cyberspace.  
And it also hopes to have some reference value to the authorities in Taiwan when they have to face a 
similar situation in the near future. 
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